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1. Introduction: Uttering the Unutterable?
The main aim of the article is to consider whether, and to what extent, 
mystics, whose experiences are supposed to be transrational (non–dualist) 
and therefore ineffable, can convey their insights through the medium of 
language. Namely, there seems to be something fundamentally paradoxical 
about mysticism: all great mystics have claimed that their insights transcend 
the dualistic structure of reason and are therefore ineffable, and yet many of 
them have left behind numerous, often voluminous accounts of their experi-
ences. As Samuel Johnson puts it, not without a tinge of sarcasm:
If Jacob [Boehme] saw the unutterable,
Jacob should not have tried to utter it.
The key question is how can language, with its seemingly rational struc-
ture, “encode” mystical experience, which is supposed to transcend all ra-
tional and linguistic categories? Are mystics, who have — if we take recourse 
to Paul’s metaphor in the First Letter to Corinthians — seen the Truth “face to 
face”, forced to absolute silence, or can they — and how? — pass on at least 
a glimmer of the Truth to us, who “see through a glass, darkly” (1 Cor 13:12)?
This paper tries to approach the central issue in two steps. First, draw-
ing on the Wittgensteinian distinction between “pointing” and “saying”, it 
is demonstrated that language not only speaks, but also acts. Mystical utter-
ances are not on par with discursive utterances, in that they don’t refer to the 
mystical, but embody and enact it. Second, various means for expressing the 
inexpressible are presented: from silence and bodily act, through evocative 
non–sense and paradox, to negation and scriptural metaphor. The expres-
sive forms are analysed according to two mutually exclusive criteria, namely 
according to how consistent they are with the nature of the experience, and 
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how suggestive their internal mechanisms are, i.e. how successful they are 
in approaching and addressing their recipient.
Before proceeding to the main topic of our discussion, however, a brief 
outline of what is meant mystical experience would be in order. The aca-
demic study of mysticism is fraught with controversy, so any attempt to 
account for it exhaustively, would not only greatly surpass the scope of the 
article, but would most likely prove futile, as all expositions in the field are 
heavily “theory–laden”. Therefore, in what follows, I will draw on my previ-
ous work (Vörös 2013a, 2013b) on the subject, where the following (tenta-
tive) definition of mystical experience was advanced:
The most prominent characteristic of “mystical experience proper” seems to be 
the breakdown of the subject–object dichotomy, i.e. the breakdown of the sense 
of my being separated from the world. This breakdown, where both “the self” 
(interiority) and “the world” (exteriority) are extinguished or transcended, is nor-
mally associated with the experience of oneness and/or nothingness, and entails 
a radical transformation of one’s state and manner of being. [The term ‘mystical 
experience’ thus covers] a whole spectrum of experiences distinguished by how 
this subject–object breakdown is realized. On the one end of the spectrum, there 
are experiences of absolute nothingness/oneness, i.e. experiences devoid of all 
phenomenological content (sensations, thoughts, volitions, emotions, etc.) in 
which nothing but pure oneness/nothingness is present; and on the other end of 
the spectrum we find experiences where this nothingness/oneness is preserved 
in and through phenomenological content. Between these two extremes lie ex-
periences in which nothingness/oneness is experientially/existentially realized 
to a lesser or greater degree (Vörös 2013a, 392–393). 
To attach a name to my position — if a name should be given it — we 
might, for pragmatic purposes, refer to it as “weak perennialism”.1 This 
provisional characterisation, albeit crude and unsatisfactory, can serve as a 
starting point for further discussion.
Another point merits a brief excursion, namely the question of the rela-
tionship between mystical and ecstatic experiences. Although it has become 
commonplace, at least in everyday language, to equate the two experiential 
categories, the matter is far from trivial. In mystical experience the mystic is 
said to transcend herself and the world — i.e. transcend the subject–object/
self–world barrier –, and this, in turn, is reminiscent of the original meaning 
of the term “ecstasy” as ek–stasis, i.e. to be or stand outside oneself. However, 
it is crucial to examine how this “standing outside oneself” is understood. If 
1 In the academic study of mysticism two theoretical positions have been established: per-
ennialism claiming that there exists a phenomenological core of mystical experiences that 
is identical across cultures, traditions etc., and constructivism claiming that no such core 
exists and that all experiences are culturally constructed. The limits of space prevent me 
from engaging in this interesting, if frustrating, debate, so the validity of the weak peren-
nialist position will simply be assumed here; I have argued for it at length elsewhere (cf. 
Vörös 2013, esp. ch. 1).
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it is taken to denote, as it often is, something akin to dissociation, i.e. a pro-
cess where a person is said to leave her body, watch it from a distance and/or 
enter the realm of spirits, angels, etc., then the two categories must be kept 
separate. If, on the other hand, it refers to escaping not only from the con-
fines of one’s body, but from the confines of one’s very self, then mystical and 
ecstatic experience might be said to share a common ground. In the former 
sense of the word, the self is merely transformed and disembodied, whereas 
in the latter it is transcended and discarded. In other words, mystical experi-
ence can be said to be ecstatic, only insofar as it is construed as dissolution, 
and not as dissociation, i.e. only insofar as it is characterized not as standing 
outside oneself, but primarily as standing outside one’s self.
2. (Un)Saying as (Un)Doing: Of Mystical Language 
Let us now go back to the central theme of our discussion, and try to discern 
the links that (un)bound the chains of language to the mystical body, starting 
with Wittgenstein’s (1961/2007) distinction between saying and pointing. In 
light of traditional (especially analytical) interpretations of Tractatus, one 
might be surprised to learn that it contains words like “sense”, “God”, and 
— “mystical”. If it is true that “the limits of my language mean the limits of 
my world” (5.6) and that “what we cannot speak about we must pass in si-
lence” (7), shouldn’t we, of all things, be silent about precisely these things? 
Upon closer inspection, one learns that “mystical” appears in three different 
propositions in Tractatus:
It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists. (6.44)
Feeling the world as a limited whole — it is this that is mystical. (6.45)
There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves 
manifest. They are what is mystical. (6.522)
The mystical, thus, is inexpressible, but it can be shown. This is why 
Wittgenstein opened Tractatus by saying that the main aim of his book is “to 
draw a limit of thought, or rather — not to thought, but to the expression of 
thoughts” (second emphasis mine). For in order to draw a limit of thought, 
“we should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable (i.e. we should have 
to be able to think what cannot be thought)”, which doesn’t make sense. Yet 
it does make sense to speak about both sides of the limit of thought, although 
the acceptable expressive forms on “this” side are bound to differ from tho-
se on the “other” side: unlike thought, which is unable to un–think itself, 
speech can un–speak itself, i.e. transcend its conceptual network and point 
to “the other side”. Wittgensteinian “pointing” therefore doesn’t take place 
inside of language — on the level of meaning –, but through language — on 
the level of doing. Put differently, it is not related to intralinguistic reference, 
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but to translinguistic transference. What language points at is not only disc-
losed but also transferred to us: it manifests in us and thereby transforms us.
Through this self–transcending “crack” in the conceptual edifice of lan-
guage we have thus clambered from a descriptive onto a performative level. 
Think of the phrase “I do”, (m)uttered at the altar. Once (m)uttered, it drasti-
cally changes our self–perception and our subsequent actions (Forman 1999, 
96–97). Similar examples include: “You are under arrest!” or “I quit [this 
job]!”. In these examples
it seems clear that to utter the sentence (in, of course, the appropriate circum-
stances) is not to describe my doing of what I should be said in so uttering to be 
doing or to state that I am doing it: it is to do it. (…) I propose to call [a sentence 
of this type] a performative sentence. (…) The name is derived, of course, from 
“perform”, the usual verb with the noun “action”: it indicates that the issuing of 
the utterance is the performing of an action — it is not normally thought of as 
just saying something” (Austin 1962, 6–7)
A “performative” is a verbal extension of bodily action; it is a linguistic 
type of behaviour aimed at achieving or doing something. And if positive per-
formatives con–join, i.e. “tie a knot”, then negative performatives dis–join, 
i.e. “untie a knot”: the opposite of “I do” is “I don’t love you anymore and 
am leaving”. What was connected in the first example (marriage), became 
disconnected in the second (divorce). Put more generally, positive performa-
tives entangle their referents into a conceptual framework, whilst negative 
performatives disentangle them from this network.
It can be seen that there exists a certain structural similarity between 
performatives and mystical “pointing”. In both cases, one enters the realm 
of activity by transcending the realm of conceptuality, but this is merely the 
first half of the story. Performatives, whether positive or negative, still oper-
ate in the domain of meaning: the action that is performed by the issuing 
of an utterance connects or disconnects the referent to or from a specific 
conceptual framework. Performatives, by their very definition, act; but these 
actions are still rooted in description: individual speech acts are meaningful, 
only insofar as they are rooted in concepts and meanings. What distinguish-
es mystical speech from ordinary performatives is the fact that its transcen-
dentality is absolute: while positive performatives entangle their referents 
into a conceptual framework and negative performatives disentangle them 
from a conceptual framework, “mystical performatives” disentangle the very 
act of entanglement, i.e. they sever the performative dimension of a language 
from its descriptive dimension. In this sense, mystical “pointing” might be 
termed an “absolutely negative performative” in that its pointing takes place 
precisely through the dis–appointment of the concept. In other words, mys-
tical language acts through inactivation of the conceptual language, i.e. it 
enacts a radically negative performative function whose goal is to project the 
subject beyond the limits of his or her linguistic system.
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Language, thus construed, is no longer a hindrance for the mystic, but 
might actually assist her on her spiritual path and serve as an effective ex-
tension of contemplative/meditative practices she is engaged in. Mystical 
language loosens the grip of rational structures and enables the mystical to 
“shine through”, wherefore mystical literature from different religious tradi-
tions can, despite vast differences in dogmatic wordings, enact the same ex-
perience: its goal is not to say anything, but to un–say the very saying (Sells 
1994). In words of Robert Forman,
Mystical experiences don’t result from a process of [conceptual] building or 
constructing mystical experience (…), but rather from an un–constructing of 
language and belief. It seems to result from something like a releasing of experi-
ence from language. Some forms of mysticism, in other words, should be seen as 
decontextualised. (Forman 1999, 99)
There is little doubt that the overall (conceptual, dogmatic, etc.) back-
ground against which mystical experience develops is of utmost importance, 
but in the last analysis, it is merely a helpful guide and therefore can, and 
has to, be transcended:
I would contend that the mystic’s knowledge is part of the necessary path that 
brings him or her to the place where that knowledge can be given up. It is a 
Hegelian Aufhebung, the simultaneous transcending and destruction of a state, 
which recognizes that state was necessary for the higher one to take place. (Janz 
1995, 93)
Mystical experience, instantiated in mystical un–saying, deconstructs 
conceptual language: It doesn’t speak about experience, but rather — as al-
ready pointed out by Otto in his classical study of numinous experiences 
(Otto 1958) — in and through experience. It evokes it, i.e. re–creates and 
re–enacts it here–and–now.
3. Ways of the Unsaying: Between Silence and Metaphor2
So what concrete possibilities are open to the mystic in her attempts to 
express the inexpressible? In order to evoke mystical experience it is not 
enough for the expressive form to be consistent with the nature of experi-
ence; it also needs to be sufficiently suggestive so as to approach and address 
its recipient. Mystical texts are therefore usually a combination of evocative 
elements, trying to re–create and re–enact the non–dual experience, and de-
scriptive elements, trying to frame the non–dual experience in dualist terms. 
The mystic is thus always torn between two extremes — consistency with 
2 Some of the ideas presented in this section draw on Jones (1993), yet digress substantially 
from some of his classifications and interpretations.
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the experience and suggestivity of the narrative. Both sides have their snares 
and pitfalls: the more suggestive (descriptive) a given form, the greater the 
danger of it becoming objectified and therefore understood literally; the 
more consistent (evocative) a given form, the greater the danger of it be-
ing completely inaccessible. This is probably why, in mystical traditions, 
the spoken (unmediated) word has precedence over the written (mediated) 
word: it enables the mystic to be in direct contact with the addressee and 
to therefore manoeuvre more skilfully between available expressive forms.
The first non–linguistic expressive form is — silence. Take, for instance, 
the following quote by Meister Eckhart:
And in the same ground, where He has His own rest, we too shall have our rest 
and possess it with Him. The place has no name, and no one can utter a word 
concerning it that is appropriate. Every word that we can say of it is more a 
denial of what God is not than a declaration of what He is. A great master saw 
that and it seemed to him that, whatever he could say in words about God, he 
could not really say anything which did not contain some falsehood. And so he 
was silent and would not say another word, though he was greatly mocked by 
other masters. Therefore it is a much greater thing to be silent about God than to 
speak. (Eckhart 2009, 223)
Similarly, Shankara recounts an Upanishadic story about
a person who approached a sage Bahva and sought from him instructions re-
garding the nature of the Brahman. Bahva did not speak. He was asked a second 
time; still he did not speak. Yet again he was asked, but sill he did not speak. 
When the inquirer became annoyed by this, Bahva told him that he was, from 
the first, by his silence telling him how Brahman was to be described; Brahman 
is silence and so cannot be represented in speech. (Dasgupta 2008, 19)
Silence is the most consistent and the least suggestive of the expressive 
forms; it is the mystic’s nod of approval to Wittgenstein’s proposition (7): 
“What we cannot speak about we must pass in silence”. If we can’t (concep-
tually) speak about the mystical, then the best thing to do is not to speak 
about it. However, since silence speaks to but few people, mystics of all 
creeds have devised other ways to express its “empty fullness”.
The second non–verbal form that tries to remain consistent with the orig-
inal experience, while simultaneously broadening its suggestive dimension, 
is bodily act. Take, for instance, the famous koan of Buddha and the flower:
Once when the World–Honoured One, in ancient times, was upon Mount Grdhr-
akuta, he held up a flower before the congregation of monks. At this time all 
were silent, but the Venerable Kashyapa only smiled. The World–Honoured One 
said, “I have the Eye of the True Law, the Secret Essence of Nirvana, the Formless 
Form, the Mysterious Law–Gate. Without relying upon words and letters, be-
yond all teaching as a special transmission, I pass this all on to Mahakashyapa.” 
(Blyth 1974, 76)
Sometimes this particular means of expressing the inexpressible takes 
on a rather dramatic form, as in the case of the koan of Gutei’s finger:
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Whatever he was asked (concerning Zen) Gutei simply stuck up one finger: At 
one time he had an acolyte, whom a visitor asked, “What is the essential point of 
your master’s teaching?” The boy just stuck up one finger. Hearing of this, Gutei 
cut off his finger with a knife. As the boy ran out of the room screaming with 
pain, Gutei called to him. When he turned round his head, Gutei stuck up one 
finger. The boy suddenly became enlightened. (ibid., 57)
Because of its non–dualist (embodied) nature, mystical experience seems 
to have greater affinity with body than with reason. It is therefore more ap-
propriate (i.e. consistent with its “nature”) to evoke mystical experience by 
means of non–dualist bodily activity than by means of language. The bod-
ily act — be it in its subtler or harsher forms — is rooted firmly in the liv-
ing present (the here–and–now), and has tremendous potential for breaking 
through the rational/conceptual meshwork. In a sense, it is “a silence with 
a twist”, but a “twist” that is potentially treacherous, as it is open to grave 
misunderstandings. Bodily acts “speak” to those with high “spiritual acu-
ity”; to others, they might seem as a witty masquerade (at best) or tasteless 
nonsense (at worst).
All this finally brings us to — language. If the mystic wants to “con-
vey” her experience to broader audience, she is obliged to take recourse to 
language. But what linguistic means are available to her? The first expres-
sive form of the linguistic type is what we might call evocative non–sense, a 
“communication amphibian” of sorts, which falls into the linguistic category 
regarding its form and into the behavioural category regarding its contents. 
The examples abound in Zen koans, e.g. in the koan about Joshu’s dog:
A monk asked Joshu whether a dog had the Buddha nature or not.
He said “[Mu!]” (Blyth 1974, 22)
Joshu’s answer is semantically vacuous but transformatively potent. 
Mu, not unlike bodily activity, transcends the everyday rationality and ena-
bles the recipient to taste or even enact the mystical non–duality. Words in 
evocative non–sense don’t speak but act — they “compensate” or “stand in” 
for sudden hand movements, blows, and other activities from the previous 
category; they are not a reply, but a reaction — an (en)action performed in 
and through words. However, what looks like an advantage from one point of 
view is a disadvantage from another; because of its embeddedness in activ-
ity, the evocative non–sense seems to be appropriate only for “advanced aco-
lytes”, while others may find its radical illogicality strange or even bizarre.
For this reason, many mystical texts adopt a weaker version of evoca-
tive non–sense, namely paradox. Paradox typically connects two opposite 
predicates, e.g. “God is everything and nothing”, “The mystical is here and 
there”, etc. The Kena Upanishad, for instance, depicts “the final realisation” 
with the following words:
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It [Brahman] is conceived of by him who does not conceive it. Who conceives 
it does not know it.
It is not understood by those who understand it.
It is understood by those who do not understand it. (in Jones 1993, 114)
Similarly, in Meister Eckhart we read: “When the soul is blind and sees 
nothing else, she sees God, and this must be so” (Eckhart 2007, 141).
In contrast to evocative non–sense, mystical paradox is not a nonsen-
sical utterance but a “conscious use of what is strictly contradictory, that 
is, any statement asserting the conjunction of one claim, a, with its logical 
negative, not–a” (Jones 1993, 114). Jones believes that mystical paradoxes 
of this sort are paradoxical only “on the surface” (ibid., 115), as the two key 
terms are used in two different senses (ibid., 116). For example, if we say 
that mystical insight is “unknowing knowing”, this would mean that it is “an 
unknowing” from the dualist perspective and “a knowing” from the non–
dualist perspective. According to Jones, a real paradox “results only when 
a statement refers to one subject in a contradictory manner”; which is not 
true for mystical utterances, as these express “different views on the world:” 
they don’t express differences between, say, “the shape versus the color of 
an object, but what is perceived in normal awareness and what is realized in 
mystical awareness”. For this reason, it is possible to provide non–paradoxi-
cal paraphrases for mystical utterances without any loss of their “assertive 
import” (ibid., 117).
Jones’ interpretation, although interesting, is completely off the mark. 
Namely, the meaning of the key terms in a mystical utterance is of secondary 
importance: what is crucial is not so much what the individual word refers 
to, but the semantic clash between two antonyms (“everything and noth-
ing”, “here and there”, “always and never”, etc.). Neither of them expresses 
the mystical: instead, what the mystic tries to achieve through the direct 
confrontation of contradictory notions is to push the recipient towards the 
limits of rationality and, by exhausting the semantic field of all alternatives 
(“everything and nothing”), point to the possible “crossing”. Here again, the 
language doesn’t speak, but acts: it is the means which enables the “suscep-
tible addressee” to en–act the experience of the mystical. However, it should 
be noted that, in the mystical paradox, this “acting” is less obvious than in 
the previous expressive form (evocative non–sense): A paradox is slightly 
more suggestive (descriptive), but therefore less consistent (evocative), as it 
is more firmly rooted in conceptuality.
Even more “word–bound” is the next expressive form, namely nega-
tion, in which “every possible positive description of the mystical is denied” 
(ibid., 112). This approach to the mystical is expressed vividly in Dionysius 
Areopagita:
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We therefore maintain that the universal Cause transcending all things is neither 
impersonal nor lifeless, nor irrational nor without understanding: in short, that 
It is not a material body, and therefore does not possess outward shape or intel-
ligible form, or quality, or quantity, or solid weight; nor has It any local existence 
which can be perceived by sight or touch; nor has It the power of perceiving 
or being perceived; nor does It suffer any vexation or disorder through the dis-
turbance of earthly passions, or any feebleness through the tyranny of material 
chances, or any want of light; nor any change, or decay, or division, or depriva-
tion, or ebb and flow, or anything else which the senses can perceive. None of 
these things can be either identified with it or attributed unto It.
Once more, ascending yet higher we maintain that It is not soul, or mind, or 
endowed with the faculty of imagination, conjecture, reason, or understanding; 
nor is It any act of reason or understanding; nor can It be described by the reason 
or perceived by the understanding, since It is not number, or order, or great-
ness, or littleness, or equality, or inequality, and since It is not immovable nor 
in motion, or at rest, and has no power, and is not power or light, and does not 
live, and is not life; nor is It personal essence, or eternity, or time; nor can It be 
grasped by the understanding since It is not knowledge or truth; nor is It king-
ship or wisdom; nor is It one, nor is It unity, nor is It Godhead538 or Goodness; 
nor is It a Spirit, as we understand the term, since It is not Sonship or Father-
hood. (...) (Rolt 1920, 103)
“The negative way” or via negativa, as exemplified by the Upanishadic 
neti neti and St. John of the Cross’ nada nada (“not [this] not [this]”), points 
towards the unthinkable by stripping it of all its attributes: the mystical is 
non–X, non–Y, etc. This approach is somewhat more suggestive, as it is in-
grained in the domain of meaning, but is also open to serious misinterpreta-
tion: when confronted with evocative non–sense and paradox, one “senses” 
the radical otherness of the mystical (the reason “runs up against its limits”, 
so to speak); the negative way, on the other hand, may mislead one into 
thinking of the mystical as “bare nothingness” (i.e. if the mystical cannot be 
explicated, then it doesn’t exist). In other words, evocative non–sense and 
paradox are open to wonder, ridicule, or dismay, but their a— or trans–ra-
tionality restricts false semantic interpretations. This, however, is not the 
case with negation: via negativa can be (falsely) interpreted as radical nega-
tion, the mystical can be (mis)interpreted as “sheer Nothingness” and not as 
“positivity–in–negativity”. In words of Alen Širca:
What is crucial here is that, in the end, negation has to negate itself, i.e. it has to 
self–negate, conceal itself. This brings forth a new order of positivity which is 
beyond all affirmation and negation, a radical alterity which — despite the drift 
from negation to self–negation, i.e. to negation negating both itself and the object 
of its negation — remains a Mystery, an ineffable, unknowable Transcendence. 
(Širca 2007, 21)
However, interpretative difficulties are even more pronounced in the 
next, and last, linguistic form. This form tries to outline the mystical in 
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positive terms and thus avoid the pitfalls of via negativa — i.e. a potential 
descent into the abyss of being–nothing–at–all — by showing that the mysti-
cal is not “sheer Nothingness”, but has “a positive aspect” as well. Yet — is 
it truly possible to affirm anything whatsoever of the Secret that lies “on the 
other side of the border”? The answer to this question is to be found in the 
so–called scriptural metaphor3:
One of the major characteristics of holy scripture is its metaphorical nature. Un-
like referents in a theoretical discourse, referents in holy scripture are not logi-
cally and semantically pre–determined or “fixed”, but are “loose” and “adrift”. 
(Uršič 1994, 150)
The “multi–layered meaning” enables scriptural metaphors to transcend 
the “limits of silence” and, through their “effability”, disentangle the “para-
doxes of ineffability”.
A metaphor, formally speaking, is always a relation between two referents; what 
is special about scriptural metaphors, however, is that the first referent is rooted 
in the hereafter, while the second referent is (supposed to be) “located” in the 
thereafter, i.e. beyond the bridge between “here” and “there”. (ibid.)
Scriptural metaphors belong to a special category of “transcendent meta-
phors”:
A scriptural metaphor points through and over itself, but it is not transparent, as 
is, for instance, an allegory. Holy scripture is not allegorical, as it doesn’t portray 
“the abstract world in a concrete form”, which is a common definition of alle-
gory. Scriptural metaphors do not “substitute” abstract ideas (…), but are what 
Karl Jaspers refers to as “ciphers of transcendence”: keys and signposts into the 
Kingdom of Heaven, which are themselves the topoi of this heavenly kingdom. 
(ibid., 151)
Scriptural metaphors enact the “Kingdom of Heaven” in and through 
themselves, and in this sense, they are not so much re–presentations (im-
ages) as re–enactments (embodiments) of the mystical. However, they are 
perceived/experienced as such only by those who have already undergone 
this process of re–enactment; for others, they are but “keys” and “signposts”, 
“prisms” dispersing faint glimmers of the mystical: “A metaphor used to 
communicate any experience only becomes clear after the intended experi-
ence has occurred” (Jones 1993, 121).
The scriptural metaphor is thus the most suggestive, but also the least 
consistent of the expressive forms: on the one hand, and because of its 
“transcendent descriptivity”, it may serve as our first contact with the mys-
tical, but on the other hand, the non–mystical mind runs the danger of iden-
3 The term “scriptural” doesn’t necessarily relate to the Christian Bible, but is, following 
Uršič, used as “a ‘typified’ label for a discourse on the Holy/Divine, which also encompass-
es Buddhist sutras, Vedic Upanishads, Koran suras, Delphic oracles, apocryphal gospels, 
etc.” (Uršič 1999, 147–148).
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tifying the “thereafter” with one of the “signposts” from the “hereafter” and 
thus fall prey to idolatry (if appreciative of spirituality) or to heated debates 
over a straw man (if critical of spirituality). The “spirit” of the metaphor (the 
transconceptual and unimaginable non–duality) may thus solidify into an 
image, leaving the metaphor, whose aim was to transduce “the Beyond”, 
opaque and obscure. Instead of letting us see the Truth “from face to face”, it 
moves, even forces us to perceive it “through a glass, darkly”.
To recapitulate briefly: Having outlined a conceptual framework for tack-
ling the issue of language and mystical experience, we focused on six means 
for expressing the inexpressible: two non–linguistic (silence and bodily act) 
and four linguistic (evocative non–sense, paradox, negation, and scriptural 
metaphor). Although the first two “expressive forms” are not linguistic in 
nature, they nonetheless prove to be of utmost importance, as they provide 
a “substratum” for all subsequent linguistic forms. The two determining pa-
rameters — consistency (evocativity) and suggestivity (descriptivity) — are 
inversely proportional to one another: the more descriptive and suggestive 
a given form, the less evocative and consistent it is and therefore open to 
grave misinterpretation (even more radically, every interpretation is already 
a misinterpretation — the mystical either discloses itself or does not; there is 
no point debating the issue). Silence is the most consistent, yet the least sug-
gestive form, and thus inappropriate for initial addresses; scriptural meta-
phor, on the other hand, is the most suggestive, yet the least consistent form, 
and thus open to the perils of objectification; other expressive forms (bodily 
act, evocative non–sense, paradox, and negation) lie somewhere in between. 
The greater the suggestivity, the lesser the capability of cultivating the expe-
riential silence about the “mystical Secret”; and conversely, the greater the 
consistency, the lesser the capability of enacting the mystical in and through 
posture, actions, or words.
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Abstract
 SAYING THE UNSAYABLE: MYSTICAL EXPERIENCE AND 
LANGUAGE
The article considers whether, and to what extent, mystical experience, which 
is supposed to be transrational (non–dualist) and therefore ineffable, can be 
conveyed in language. The article consists of two parts. First, drawing on the 
Wittgensteinian distinction between “pointing” and “saying”, it is suggested that 
language not only speaks, but also acts. Mystical utterances are thus not on par 
with discursive utterances, in that they don’t refer to the mystical, but embody 
and enact it. Second, different means of expressing the inexpressible are out-
lined: from silence and bodily act, through evocative non–sense and paradox, to 
negation and scriptural metaphor. The expressive forms are analysed according 
to two mutually exclusive criteria, namely according to how consistent they are 
with the nature of the experience, and how suggestive their internal mechanisms 
are, i.e. how successful they are in approaching and addressing their recipient. 
It is suggested that the two criteria are inversely proportional to one another: the 
more descriptive and suggestive a given form, the less evocative and consistent 
it is and therefore open to grave misinterpretation.
KEYWORDS: mysticism, mystical experience, language, ineffability, silence, para-
dox, negation
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